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ABSTRACT 
This article extends the debate on grounded theory method (GTM) 
commenced by Bryant (2002). It discusses  the charges of ‘phenomenalism’  and 
‘naïve inductionism’, that Bryant levels at GTM, and asks if they are fair 
criticism of the method, or reinforcing prejudices about GTM that might hinder 
its take up in the field of information systems research. In particular, the article 
considers the idea of the researcher using GTM as a ‘blank slate’ with no 
preconceptions, and finds this idea not to be supported in the GTM literature. 
The central paradox of GTM, as a subjective coding process which also claims to 
systematic is also discussed. The article concludes with some suggestions for IS 
researchers using GTM, and also questions how much GTM  is actually used for 
theory generation in IS.  
INTRODUCTION 
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) has been increasingly used by 
qualitative researchers in the information 
systems discipline in recent years.  The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) was seen as quite revolutionary 
at the time. This book outlined a research 
methodology that aimed to systematically 
derive theories of human behaviour from 
empirical data and was also a reaction to 
‘armchair’ functionalist theories in sociology 
of the time (Kendall 1999, Dey 1999). As 
Bryant points out, it is useful to discuss 
Grounded Theory Method (GTM) in order to 
distinguish the process of generating grounded 
theory (the method) from its objective, a 
‘grounded’ theory about a particular 
phenomena, so called because the theory has a 
very close tie to the data and therefore can be 
‘grounded’ in the data. After its inception in 
1967, GTM spread fairly quickly as an 
accepted qualitative research method, 
particularly in the health field. There were 
several more books and articles by the co-
originators which  developed, and later, 
debated the method (Glaser & Strauss 1967, 
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Glaser 1978, Strauss 1987, Strauss & Corbin 
1989, Strauss and Corbin 1990, Glaser 1992, 
Strauss & Corbin 1994, Glaser 1995, Glaser 
1998).  
As a well established method for 
analysing qualitative data and generating 
theory in other fields, it is perhaps not 
surprising that there is increasing interest in 
using GTM in IS. Dey (1999), drawing on 
Creswell (1998) gives 12 characteristics of 
GTM and these are shown in Table 1. 
GTM is well signposted in the literature 
which makes it attractive to new researchers, 
as it does give very clear guidance on how to 
code qualitative data, and table 1 gives some 
indication of the extent of that guidance. 
However, it should be noted that GTM is as 
much about generating theory inductively as it 
is about analysing data, though less used for 
this in IS research thus far. The notion of 
setting aside theoretical ideas is often to held 
to imply that the researcher does not look at 
existing literature, and GTM has been much 
criticised for what is seen as a tabula rasa 
approach, where the researcher is a ‘blank 
slate’. However, Glaser and Strauss’s position 
on this is actually less stringent than at first 
glance. One challenge for IS researchers using 
GTM is how to tailor this essentially inductive 
research process to the more conventional, and 
deductive, presentation required in theses and 
journal articles. 
In the field of information systems 
research, GTM has been used mainly, though 
not exclusively, in interpretive research as 
GTM is a useful way of analysing qualitative 
data, irrespective of philosophical position. 
Some examples from the past decade in IS 
include Toraskar 1991, Orlikowski 1993, 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper is both a reply to Bryant’s 
(2002) article in JITTA on grounded theory 
method, and an extension to the debate on 
the use of GTM in IS. In particular, the 
paper looks at the charges of positivism 
levelled at GTM by Bryant’s article and 
asks if they are firstly fair, and secondly, if 
those charges matter. 
The paper extends the debate by 
examining the central paradox of GTM – 
that it is an inductive method, founded on a 
subjective process – the coding of data – 
that claims to be a systematic, unbiased 
method for generating theory. It also 
suggests that IS researchers look closely at 
whether they are using GTM simply as a 
coding method, or as a method of 
generating theory. 
Table 1 Key Characteristics of Grounded Theory Method (Cresswell 1998) 
1 The aim of grounded theory is to generate or discover a theory. 
2 The researcher has to set aside theoretical ideas to allow a ‘substantive’ theory to 
emerge. 
3 Theory focuses on how individuals interact in relation to the phenomenon under study. 
4 Theory asserts a plausible relation between concepts and sets of concepts. 
5 Theory is derived from data acquired through fieldwork interviews, observations and 
documents. 
6 Data analysis is systematic and begins as soon as data is available. 
7 Data analysis proceeds through identifying categories and connecting them. 
8 Further data collection (or sampling) is based on emerging concepts. 
9 These concepts are developed through constant comparison with additional data. 
10 Data collection can stop when no new conceptualisations emerge. 
11 Data analysis proceeds from ‘open’ coding (identifying categories, properties and 
dimensions) through ‘axial’ coding (examining conditions, strategies and 
consequences) to ‘selective’ coding around an emerging storyline. 
12 The resulting theory can be reported in a narrative framework or as a set of 
propositions. 
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Urquhart 1997, Urquhart 1998, Urquhart 
1999a, 1999b, 2001b, Adams & Sasse 1999, 
Baskerville & Pries−Heje 1999, and Trauth 
2000 – most of these articles, but not all, are 
interpretive research. GTM has been 
increasingly described and debated as well as 
more and more IS researchers discover the 
method, and Howcroft & Hughes 2000, 
Urquhart 2001a, are two examples of this 
debate in IS. GTM has been widely debated in 
other fields as well, as it is, after all, a method 
of 35 years standing.  
Antony Bryant’s (2002) article in 
JITTA entitled ‘Re-Grounding Grounded 
Theory’, is an example of the increasing re-
examination of grounded theory method 
(GTM) that is taking place in IS, as it is used 
by increasing numbers of researchers to 
analyse qualitative data. Bryant gives an 
excellent assessment of grounded theory from 
both a systems and ethnographic perspective. 
He quite rightly points out that GTM needs to 
be retrieved from its apparently  positivist 
origins – so far so good, especially as most of 
the application of GTM in IS seems to be in 
interpretive research. Unfortunately, he 
neglects a large body of work in other fields 
that debates precisely that point, and he makes 
some sweeping claims about the nature of 
GTM that beg for a reply. The concern here is 
that overstated claims of GTM’s positivist 
nature simply reinforce old prejudices about 
GTM that bear little relation to how it is used 
today in IS. 
This article revisits some of the issues 
raised in Bryant’s article, and extends the 
debate by considering how the process of 
coding in GTM contributes to the subjectivity, 
or otherwise, of the method. 
• Firstly, this article re-examines the charge 
of positivism made by Bryant, and 
considers its importance for IS 
researchers, given the prevalence of GTM 
use in interpretive, rather than positivist, 
IS research. 
• Secondly, the idea put forward in the 
Bryant article that GTM applies the rule of 
phenomenalism is discussed. As defined 
by Giddens (1974), phenomenalism 
asserts that only reality immediately 
apprehended by the perceiver can be 
classed as knowledge and this is part of 
the philosophy of positivism. The issue 
here is how this relates to the focus on 
‘data’ in GTM and whether one is a 
necessary precursor of the other.  
• Thirdly, the charge of ‘naïve Baconian 
inductionism’ contained in the Bryant 
article. This charge essentially relates to 
the tabula rasa which some people think 
GTM requires. This article examines that 
charge and what the implications are for 
IS researchers use of the literature when 
using GTM. 
• Finally, this article extends the debate by 
discussing the subjective nature of the 
coding which is at the heart of GTM – and 
asks the question, if coding is an 
essentially subjective process, how 
systematic a method of theory generation 
can GTM actually claim to be? 
GTM – QUALITATIVE METHOD IN 
POST POSITIVIST CLOTHING? 
GTM is paradoxical and unique – a 
method for analysing qualitative data which 
also claims to be a systematic way of 
generating theory. For this reason alone, there 
are bound to be debates about whether it is 
positivist or interpretivist in nature. Certainly, 
in the 1967 book, Glaser and Strauss make 
great play of the systematic nature of their 
method of theory generation, and there are 
many positivist sounding statements in that 
book. However, one has to consider the 
historical context of the time; Discovery was 
published at a time when many so-called softer 
fields, such as sociology, were striving for 
academic respectability and wanted to be seen 
as ‘scientific’. Bryant makes the interesting 
point that the central texts of GTM have been 
almost silent on the issues of epistemology and 
philosophy over the past 30 years, and that this 
is surprising given the developments that have 
taken place in these areas. While the central 
texts may not have debated it much, many 
people using it in other fields have done so. At 
this point, we can also ask, why is it at all 
necessary to debate whether GTM is positivist 
or interpretivist in nature? 
One key to why the debate is important 
to interpretive IS researchers at least, is 
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contained in the  Klein and Myers (1999) 
paper on principles for conducting interpretive 
field research, where they state that researchers 
should make the fundamental philosophical 
assumptions of their research clear. Many 
interpretive methods, such as ethnography, 
phenomenology, and hermeneutics, have a 
clear philosophical basis. In using the method, 
one also accepts the accompanying 
philosophy. So, for any interpretive researcher 
using GTM, the challenge is to discover what 
the philosophical foundations of GTM are, and 
whether use of the method carries some 
philosophical implications. Given that most of 
the use of GTM seems to be by interpretive 
researchers, it is important that the 
philosophical position of GTM be debated. 
One way of trying to get to the 
philosophical basis of GTM is to look at the 
background of the originators and their views. 
As Bryant also points out, one of the 
originators of grounded theory method, 
Strauss, comes from the symbolic 
interactionist school (Annells 1996), 
something rarely remarked upon in 
information systems literature. Symbolic 
interactionism holds that the individual enters 
their own experience only as an object, not a 
subject, and that entry is predicated on the 
basis of social relations and interactions (Mead 
1962, in Annells 1996). This leads Annells 
(1996) to place grounded theory within an 
ontology of critical realism, as part of the post-
positivist paradigm (Guba & Lincoln 1994). 
Critical realism holds that there is one reality, 
however imperfectly apprehendible (Guba & 
Lincoln 1994). Annells (1996) points to 
statements by Glaser (1992) about the classic 
mode of grounded theory focusing on 
‘concepts of reality’(p.14)  and  searching for 
‘true meaning’(p.55) as evidence of a critical 
realist position. It should be noted however, 
that Glaser (1999) has said: 
“In some quarters of research, grounded 
theory is considered qualitative, symbolic 
interaction research. It is a kind of takeover..” 
Interestingly, both symbolic 
interactionism and grounded theory have also 
been claimed as interpretive approaches, 
where the ontology is one of socially 
constructed meaning systems which is based 
on an internal experience of reality (Neuman 
1997). Grounded theory has also been linked 
to philosophical hermeneutics which offer an 
alternative  to empiricist and historicist 
accounts of science (Thompson 1990). Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1990) suggestion of a 
conditional matrix, which incorporates 
consideration of larger contextual issues of 
historical, political and economic conditions, 
can be seen to lean toward a relativist 
approach (Annells 1996). Strauss (1987) 
suggests that the researcher is actively 
involved with the method, and again this can 
be interpreted as a relativist statement  
(Annells 1996). In contrast to the very post 
positivist sounding ‘criteria and canons’ of 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) for judging 
grounded theory studies, Glaser (1992) states 
that the criteria for judging a grounded theory 
are ‘fit, work, relevance, modifiability, 
parsimony and explanatory scope’. These 
sound considerably closer to Guba and 
Lincoln’s (1989) authenticity criteria for 
constructivism, such as fairness and improved 
understanding, than Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990) criteria. So, it seems that both Glaser, 
Strauss, Strauss and Corbin, have at  different 
times, and sometimes simultaneously, leaned 
toward both post positivism and 
interpretivism. Madill, Jordan and Shirley 
(2000) argue quite convincingly that the 
philosophical position adopted when using 
grounded theory depends on the extent to 
which the findings are considered to be 
discovered within the data, or as the result of 
construction of intersubjective meanings. They 
locate the former view as Glaser’s (1992) 
position and the latter as Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990). 
One of the enduring paradoxes of 
grounded theory is that, above all it is an 
inductive method and has been stated as so 
from the very beginning (Glaser & Strauss 
1967), and yet it is seen as a post positivist 
method. Post positivism, like its predecessor 
still places great value on deduction as a way 
of discovering a research problem. Grounded 
theory’s original aim was to inductively 
generate formal theory, via the route of 
substantive theory (that is, pertaining to a 
particular area), in the field of sociology.  
Glaser (1992) lays great stress on the 
‘emergent’ nature of grounded theory method, 
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and states that the data should not be ‘forced’ 
into conceptual categories. It is the inductive 
and emergent nature of the method that seems 
most at odds with an underlying ontology of 
critical realism. Strauss and Corbin (1990) talk 
of a ‘reality that cannot actually be known, but 
is always interpreted’.  
Bryant rightly says the characterisation 
of grounded theory method, as proposed in 
1967, is a product of the political and historical 
context of the time. He says that it is surprising 
that the founders, in the 1980s and 1990s, have 
not engaged positivism with critiques. Why is 
it surprising?  The key to this lack is simply 
that, GTM is, first and foremost, a method, and 
indeed all the writings of the founders are 
bound up with this concern, rather than 
philosophical issues. Bryant himself is careful 
to distinguish between grounded theory as a 
possible outcome of using grounded theory 
method, and the method itself. 
It is probably appropriate to quote 
Glaser (1999), who stated during a conference 
address:  
“Let me be clear. Grounded theory is a 
general method. It can be used on any data or 
combination of data.” 
While it is clearly useful to consider the 
philosophical baggage that any research 
method might have, it may simply be that the 
focus of grounded theory method, as a method 
of analysing data, has precluded much 
consideration of ontology or epistemology by 
its founders. This gives rise to the varying 
interpretations of others using the method 
(Thompson 1990, Annells 1996, Madill et al 
2000) as being simultaneously located in 
relativism, hermeneutics and constructivism, 
especially when it has been used by 
researchers in other fields for over thirty years. 
In information systems GTM has been 
largely used within an interpretive context 
(Toraskar 1991, Orlikowski 1993, Urquhart 
1997, 1998a, 1999a, 1999b, 2001b, 
Baskerville & Pries−Heje 1999, Trauth 2000) 
but also more positivist ones (eg Adams and 
Sasse 1999). One could argue that, as long as 
IS researchers are clear about their own 
philosophy, GTM can then be subsequently 
located in any paradigm as a way of analysing 
data. 
Thus, it is questionable whether there is 
an urgent need to retrieve GTM from its 
positivist origins; this has been quietly 
happening in IS for over a decade. Perhaps the 
final word should go to Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991), where they reference Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) and GTM,  as an example 
of an interpretive viewpoint. They quote 
Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) statement that the 
primary endeavour is to describe, interpret, 
and analyse the social world from the 
participant’s perspective, and that all rigid a 
priori researcher imposed formulations of 
structure, function, purpose and attribution are 
resisted (Glaser and Strauss 1967, in 
Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). On the face of 
it, this would seem a very interpretive way of 
looking at the world and is contained in the 
very first book ever written on grounded 
theory method. So, since 1991, some 
researchers in IS have seen GTM as an 
interpretive method,  concerned with analysing 
the world from the participants perspective – 
thus it provides a means to analyse participants 
interpretations. 
Bryant however does level some 
serious charges at GTM, namely the ‘rule of 
phenomenalism’ which is linked to value-
neutral observations, and ‘naïve Baconian 
inductionism’ (Haig 1995) which assumes the 
researcher as a tabula rasa or blank slate, 
going into the field without any 
preconceptions. The next two sections 
examine these charges in detail. 
IS GTM GUILTY OF 
PHENOMENALISM? 
Bryant goes to some length to claim 
that GTM is at heart phenomenalist. As 
defined by Giddens (1974), phenomenalism 
asserts that only reality immediately 
apprehended by the perceiver can be classed as 
knowledge, and this is part of the philosophy 
of positivism. What Bryant seems to be saying 
is that, because data is seen as an 
unexceptional category and simply what is 
observed, this points to a consistently positivist 
and phenomenalist strand in GTM, especially 
when the theory is ‘grounded in the data’. 
One difficulty here is this – is the issue 
the grounding in the ‘data’, or the use of the 
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word ‘data’, or both? It is not clear why use of 
the word data, or grounding in data, should be 
positivist or phenomenalist. The waters are 
muddied further when Bryant quotes Haig 
(1995) who says that theories typically are 
grounded in phenomena, not data. This only 
serves to confuse, as the word data used in 
GTM can be shown to be quite a broad term 
and to cover some ‘phenomena’. Haig (1995) 
does give a working definition of phenomena 
(p.3) as a ‘varied ontological bag that includes 
objects, states, processes and events and other 
features which are hard to classify’. He 
contrasts this with data which are in his view 
are idiosyncratic to particular contexts (p.4). 
However, Strauss (1987) points out that there 
are many sources of data, and these are not 
confined to observations.  It is noteworthy that 
GTM is also said to be good for studying 
processes (Glaser 1978, Orlikowski 1993), 
which in Haig’s (1995) view would fall into 
the category of phenomena.   
Haig then goes on to suggest that 
theories in GTM should be grounded in 
phenomena, not data.  Yet the definition of 
data provided by GTM suggests that at least 
some of this ‘data’ is in fact phenomena in 
Haig’s terms. GTM aims to build substantive 
theories, meaning that the theory is particular 
to the object of investigation only. This is 
similar to the idea Haig puts forward about a 
theory being grounded in data idiosyncratic to 
particular contexts. One possible interpretation 
of this is that, in Haig’s view, GTM should be 
orientated to larger scale theories – relating to 
his particular definition of phenomena. 
Interestingly, Strauss (1987) takes much the 
same line when he talks about substantive 
theories shading into larger, more formal 
theories. 
Haig’s views – partially represented in 
Bryant’s article and expanded on in this one, 
can perhaps be seen as a sideshow with regard 
to the charge of phenomenalism, albeit an 
interesting sideshow. There is perhaps a 
difference between Gidden’s view of 
phenomenalism as represented by Bryant, and 
Haig’s (1995) view of phenomena. In any 
case, Haig seems much more concerned with 
the theory generation side of things.  
More importantly, Bryant’s claim that, 
in GTM, data is seen as an unexceptional 
category and that it is simply what is observed, 
needs to be challenged. The problem here is 
that the process of theory generation in GTM 
involves coding. Coding means that the data is 
analysed and transformed into categories. 
Most people would agree that coding, by its 
very nature, is an inherently subjective 
process. Therefore it is hard to see data as an 
unexceptional category as Bryant claims, and 
why this would contribute to a charge of 
phenomenalism and positivism. Bryant also 
raises the very same issue of subjectivity later 
in his paper, when he rightly says that, stripped 
of its scientific veneer, GTM is essentially 
concerned with meaning construction. A key 
question about GTM is whether two 
researchers, given the same data and the same 
research problem, would come up with the 
same categories for their data. This 
contradictory and somewhat paradoxical idea – 
a systematic method for generating theory 
(GTM) based on an essentially subjective 
process (coding and induction) that can and 
does have different results depending on the 
researcher, is discussed later in the paper. 
If the issue is that somehow it is not 
possible for a theory to be ‘grounded in the 
data’, or that to do so is somehow 
phenomenalist, then there are many 
interpretive users of GTM that would disagree. 
For many researchers using GTM to analyse 
qualitative data, the whole attraction of GTM 
is precisely that close tie to the data. For any 
conceptualisation that a researcher chooses to 
make, the method of constant comparison 
(which involves constantly comparing 
instances of data labelled as a particular 
category with other instances of data, to see if 
these categories fit and are workable) can 
provide many instances of that particular 
conceptualisation. This produces rigorous 
research, because any claim made will be 
backed up by not one instance in the data, but 
repeating instances.  Moreover, because GTM 
codes observations at a detailed level, the 
concepts produced tend to be more substantial 
than if one had done a ‘top down’ analysis and 
picked broad themes from the data. 
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THE CHARGE OF  NAÏVE 
INDUCTIONISM AND THEORETICAL 
SENSITIVITY 
Bryant also makes much of  Haig’s 
(1995, p.2) charge of ‘naïve Baconian 
inductionism’ in GTM. He also criticises 
DeVreede et al (1999) paper, which uses GTM 
in a cross cultural field study of GSS, for using 
a form of inductionism that has been largely 
discredited. He is also critical of De Vreede et 
al’s lack of justification for being guided by 
existing theories. These two issues are linked, 
and are bound up with the way GTM is 
wrongly perceived as not taking cognisance of 
other theories and literature.  
If we look carefully at Haig’s position, 
he does in fact elaborate on what ‘naïve 
Baconian inductionism’ is,  by saying the 
charge of naïve inductionism equates to the 
way that  
‘grounded theory is depicted as a tabula 
rasa view of inquiry, which indefensibly 
maintains that observations are not theory or 
concept dependent’ (p.5).  
Haig goes on to refute the charge of 
‘naïve inductionism’ by pointing out that 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) explicitly say that  
‘the researcher does not approach reality 
as a tabula rasa..[he or she] must have a 
perspective in order to see relevant data and 
abstract relevant categories from 
[it]’(emphases added). 
The ‘tabula rasa’ idea, therefore, can be 
seen as a corruption of the idea of theoretical 
sensitivity (Glaser 1978). One of the tenets of 
theoretical sensitivity is that the researcher 
enters the research setting with as few 
predetermined views as possible, especially 
logically deducted, prior hypotheses (Glaser 
1978). That said, theoretical sensitivity is 
increased by being steeped in the literature and 
associated general ideas (Glaser 1978), so that 
a researcher will understand what a theory is. 
Thus the idea of theoretical sensitivity can be 
seen as an injunction against a deductive mode 
of thinking rather than an injunction against 
the literature or concepts per se. 
(Glaser 1992, p. 31) further elaborates 
by stating that theoretical sensitivity is: 
An ability to generate concepts from 
data and relate them to the normal models 
of theory  in general.. 
So, literature is used to help build the 
theory, and the substantive theory related to 
the literature, but only once the substantive 
theory has been developed. According to 
Glaser (1992, p. 31), the dictum in grounded 
theory is that there is no need to review the 
literature in the substantive area under study, 
and that this idea is: 
‘brought about by the concern that 
literature might contaminate, stifle or 
contaminate or otherwise impede the 
researchers effort to generate 
categories..’ 
He hastens to add though, that this 
applies only in the beginning, and that when 
the theory is sufficiently developed, that the 
researcher needs to review the literature in the 
substantive field and relate that literature to 
their own work  (Glaser 1992). 
Strauss’s (1987) opinion on the issue of 
literature, was that the advice about delaying 
the scrutiny of related literature applies full 
force to inexperienced researchers, but less so 
to experienced researchers who are already 
good at subjecting a theoretical statement to 
comparative analysis, and would question 
whether it would hold ‘true’ under different 
conditions. Strauss (1987) also says that, once 
a grounded theory is developed, researchers 
should grapple with other theories, and either 
incorporate them or critique them. 
So the position of DeVreede et al 
(1999), in relating their theory to the TAM 
model, does in fact have some support in the 
grounded theory canon of literature.  Bryant 
makes an interesting point in questioning 
whether the ‘cognitive evasion’ required by 
this position is actually possible. Clearly the 
founders of GTM saw it as a device to prevent 
unoriginal, deductive and derivative thinking 
about categories in the early stages of a theory, 
but are also interested in how a grounded 
theory might relate to other theories. 
The ‘tabula rasa’ idea remains a 
popular misconception about GTM, and can in 
some cases make it difficult for IS researchers 
to adopt the method. Postgraduate students in 
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IS wishing to use the method can find 
themselves restricted by a standard view of 
research which assumes that a complete 
literature search, and a very defined research 
problem, comes before entering the field. 
Similarly, the standard format of a journal 
article puts literature before the study results, 
implying that this is what happened, whereas 
in practice the grounded theory user would do 
the bulk of the literature searching afterward.  
That said, there is nothing in the GTM 
literature that specifically precludes looking at 
relevant literature before entering the field, and 
then conducting a further search in order to 
relate the theory produced to the literature. The 
thing to keep in mind is the purpose of the 
injunction about delaying the literature search 
– which is to produce categories that are not 
influenced by concepts from the literature. If a 
researcher produces categories that are 
reminiscent of existing theories, this goes 
against the emergent and inductive nature of 
GTM. Worse, the researcher can end up 
‘forcing the data’ (Glaser 1992) into 
preconceived categories. In practice, a 
researcher can refer to existing literature 
before commencing data analysis, but should 
be mindful – and check for – categories that 
may have come from the literature. 
THE PARADOX OF GTM – INDUCTIVE 
AND EMERGENT AND SYSTEMATIC? 
Bryant rightly identifies the problem 
with GTM as it being offered in terms of both 
a qualitative one, and also a good scientific 
one (It is also what makes the debate so 
interesting). An associated problem is that the 
method has clearly evolved over the period of 
35 years, so for every seeming positivist 
statement by one founder, a correspondingly 
interpretivist statement can be found by 
another. As GTM has been used in the health 
field for as many years, many contradictory 
statements can be found in this stream of 
research as well. 
One could argue that the method itself 
is paradoxical. When Glaser (1992) talks about 
‘emergence’, his major concern is that the data 
should speak to the researcher, rather than be 
‘forced’ into categories. He criticises Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) for being overly 
prescriptive and over concerned with 
description and conceptualisation (this is the 
essence of the famous ‘split’ between the co 
founders in 1992).  It seems that Glaser is 
arguing for induction in its purest sense. Most 
researchers who have used GTM will attest to 
that ‘emergence’ – not necessarily a mystical 
process, but one where one sees the data in an 
entirely new way. Putting aside preconceptions 
does result in original insights to the data, and 
the method of constant comparison does 
enable the researcher to understand their data 
set and ‘ground’ the theory. So, as a process 
GTM combines creativity and some rules to 
enhance that creativity.  
So, how does that creativity and 
subjectivity stack up against the claim that 
theory can be systematically generated? 
Certainly, the advantage of GTM is that it has 
well signposted procedures, reassuring to 
novice researchers. More importantly, it 
enables the researcher to demonstrate that a 
particular coding procedure has been followed, 
and this helps justify research. It is arguable 
that all good research should be able to 
demonstrate a chain of analysis, and GTM 
helps in this regard.  
With regard to how systematic GTM is, 
Madill et al (2000) carry out an interesting 
exercise when they examine what happens 
when two researchers analyse the same data 
set using GTM. Unsurprisingly, the analytic 
categories generated by the two researchers 
are different. Madill et al then analyse the 
outcomes from realist, contextual 
constructionist, and radical constructionist 
perspectives.  
They conclude that, from a realist 
perspective, the issue becomes one of level of 
analysis, and that the categories can be 
reasonably well integrated into themes. From a 
contextualist perspective, researcher 
subjectivity is the issue – and analytic style is 
an aspect of this. Researchers would be 
expected to identify different codes depending 
on training and research interests. Thus, 
researchers should articulate their position to 
enable the reader to judge their analyses. 
The radical constructionist perspective 
would be concerned with the issue of  reifying 
subjectivity and underlying rhetorical devices 
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that may exist in the text (Madill et al 2000). 
What is interesting about this exercise is that 
the degree of ‘subjectivity’ detected depends 
entirely on the philosophical position of the 
researcher using the coding method. Thus 
Madill et al neatly separate out the coding 
process of GTM from any accompanying 
philosophy and then consider that coding from 
the researchers own philosophical perspective. 
So, how systematic the method is may be 
entirely in the eye of the beholder and linked 
more to philosophical position rather than any 
rigour inherent in the method itself. 
Madill’s approach of separating 
research philosophy from the coding process 
of GTM seems a much more reasonable way 
of looking at GTM. Certainly, it has been used 
in IS more as a coding method rather than a 
research method imbued with a particular 
philosophy. It is arguable that the take up of 
GTM of IS in the past 10 years has much to 
with it being a clearly explicated and well 
respected method of coding qualitative data, 
rather than a concern with building theories. 
There are other approaches to coding, such as 
using predetermined codes or taking a 'middle 
order' approach (Dey 1993), where some 
preliminary distinctions in the data are made. 
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) chapter on 
coding and analysing data also provides a 
wider perspective on coding qualitative data 
per se. Experience with using GTM shows that 
it is essentially a ‘bottom up’ coding method. 
Therefore, it is not unusual for researchers to 
find that GTM gives them a low level theory 
which they find difficult to ‘scale up’ 
appropriately. 
One issue then, in our use of GTM in IS 
is to clearly identify what we are using it for a) 
a coding method, or b) a method of theory 
generation.  There is ample evidence in IS 
literature for the first use, much less for the 
second.  One useful side effect of using GTM 
in IS could be a much more detailed 
consideration of the role of theory – and 
generation of our own theories specific to IS. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to refute 
some of the charges of positivism made of 
GTM made by Bryant, and to extend the 
debate further about the use of GTM by IS 
researchers. 
In dealing with the idea that GTM is 
positivist (or indeed post positivist), we can 
ask, does it matter that it is? The answer is 
that, to interpretivist researchers, it does 
matter, lest they import a philosophy along 
with the method, that is at odds with their own.  
What is interesting is that the founders 
themselves seem to have leant in different 
directions over the past 35 years, on this issue. 
This is possibly because the focus is primarily 
on the method, and the mechanics of analysing 
data using the method. In other disciplines, 
researchers seemed to have claimed GTM for 
both interpretivism and positivism. How is this 
possible? Partially because GTM is itself 
paradoxical – a coding method  (and coding is 
of necessity subjective) that claims to generate 
systematic theory. One pragmatic answer for 
IS researchers is simply to use GTM as a 
method, within their own philosophical bias. 
As Bryant points out, GTM’s seemingly 
positivist origins do not negate its use by 
interpretive researchers. Bryant notes 
Orlikowki’s (1993) description of GTM as 
inductive, contextual and processual, and this 
is an excellent description of the strengths of 
GTM. 
At the same time, how exactly GTM is 
being used by IS researchers should merit 
more of our attention. At the moment, it seems 
to be used much more as a coding method, as 
distinct from a method of generating theory. 
There is very little discussion in IS literature of 
how theory might actually be generated using 
GTM, and there is still not much in the way of 
practical examples of coding. It is significant 
that Glaser (2002) is now contributing to that 
debate by writing about conceptualisation and 
the need to distinguish between description 
and analysis. There are a number of 
implications for researchers in IS considering 
using the method. 
Firstly, researchers also need to be 
aware that GTM, however respected as a 
method, is not the only method of qualitative 
coding of data available. Secondly, they need 
to know that there are particular issues 
associated with the detailed level of analysis 
that GTM requires.  Thirdly, IS researchers 
need to carefully consider their use of the 
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literature and how this fits into a conventional 
research process. Fourthly, they need to 
consider if they are intending to generate a 
theory, or simply use GTM’s well defined 
coding procedures. 
Some researchers in IS have written 
about the experience of using GTM, notably 
Hughes and Howcroft (2000), and Urquhart 
(2001a). What is required now is more 
attention to the practical issues that are 
presented whenever GTM is used as a method 
of qualitative data analysis. At the moment, the 
issue of theory generation in IS using GTM 
seems largely unexplored.  
As more IS researchers use the method, 
more discussion of philosophical and practical 
issues surrounding GTM will emerge. On at 
least one point (if not on a number of points) 
Bryant and this author are agreed – GTM has a 
long and healthy future in IS, and is a viable 
and useful qualitative research method. The 
philosophy, practice, and the various uses and 
abuses of GTM in IS are well worth debating. 
In particular, we need to ask ourselves – is 
GTM simply a useful and ‘respectable’ coding 
method for qualitative data in IS, or are we 
serious about using it as a method of theory 
generation? 
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